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Abstract. The current paper employs a novel Shadow Play Paradigm to investigate 
the semantic knowledge and pragmatic ability of Romanian 5-year-olds with respect 
to the epistemic adverbs poate ‘maybe’ and sigur ‘certainly’. The paradigm is an 
improved version of the Hidden Object Paradigm, where, instead of merely looking at 
an inaccessible entity, participants can now infer the presence of the entity on the basis 
of evidence (a shadow, as well as a specific sound). We argue that Romanian children 
as young as 5 are able to derive implicatures with epistemic adverbs at an almost adult-
like level. However, they exhibit the tendency to accept overly strong statements (i.e., 
statements where a certainty adverb is wrongly used instead of a possibility adverb) as 
optimal to a much higher degree than adults. This can be explained as a 
cognitive/communicative strategy to reduce multiple alternatives to a single one in 
cases of uncertainty. 
Keywords. Language acquisition; Romanian L1; scalar implicatures; modality; 
epistemic adverbs; premature closure hypothesis 
1. Aim. The current paper is among the first studies to investigate the semantics and pragmatics 
of epistemic adverbs (possibility, not certainty implicatures) in child Romanian (see also Bleotu 
2019). Importantly, it employs a novel Shadow Play Paradigm, an improved version of the 
traditional Hidden Object Paradigm (Hirst & Weil 1982, Noveck, Ho & Sera 1996, Noveck 2001, 
Ozturk & Papafragou 2015, Moscati, Zhan & Zhou 2017, a.o.), where participants have to make 
inferences about the presence of a hidden object/animal on the basis of evidence. While, in the 
traditional paradigm, participants have no direct access to the hidden object/animal and rely solely 
on reasoning, sometimes showing caution in their answers, in the Shadow Play Paradigm, 
additional cues (the object/animal’s shadow and specific sound) support participants’ logical 
reasoning. As we will show, in the improved paradigm, children behave more adult-like than in 
the Hidden Object Paradigm with respect to implicature-generation with the epistemic poate 
‘maybe’. However, they behave non-adult-like in accepting as optimal overly strong statements, 
where certainty adverbs are wrongly employed instead of possibility adverbs. 
The paper is organized as follows: After presenting some background on the acquisition of 
epistemic modality in Section 2, we present our novel Shadow Play paradigm in Section 3. In 
Section 4, we discuss the implications of our experimental results, and Section 5 presents the 
conclusions of our research. 
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2. Background on the acquisition of epistemic modality. The experiment we conducted deals 
with epistemic modality, a type of modality which refers to the degree of speaker-commitment to 
the truth of the proposition expressed by the complement (Kratzer 1981, Coates 1983, Sweetser 
1982, 1990, Palmer 1986, a.o.). Epistemic modality translates into certainty or uncertainty about a 
situation, an attitude resulting from an inference based on evidence. This type of modality is 
usually set in contrast to root modality, which refers either to the necessity (obligation) or 
possibility (permission) of certain actions given society or moral rules (in the case of deontic 
modality) or to the ability or willingness (volition) to perform a certain action (in the case of 
dynamic modality). Given the wide literature on the acquisition of epistemic modality, we will 
briefly touch on some essential aspects, and then focus on the experiments relevant for our study. 
In the acquisition literature, there is a general consensus that epistemic modality emerges after 
root modality (Schatz & Wilcox 1977, Wells 1979, Shepherd 1982, Perkins 1983, Stephany 1986). 
Children produce deontic modals as early as 1;1, while they produce epistemic modals later 
(around 3). Importantly, this order in acquisition is considered a reflection of a child’s mental 
development, that is, their Theory of Mind (Wellman 1990, Gopnik 1993, Gopnik & Wellman 
1994, Papafragou 1998, 2000). This refers to the ability to reflect upon one’s and others’ thoughts, 
to represent beliefs as belonging to someone else than themselves. Interestingly though, not all 
epistemic modals behave in the same way: Epistemic adverbs/adjectives (e.g., possible/ly, 
certain/ly) emerge before the age of 3 (O’Neill & Atance 2000, Cournane 2015, Veselinović and 
Cournane 2020), whereas epistemic verbs (e.g., might, must) emerge after this age. This contrast 
in production is unexpected under an explanation that relies solely on Theory of Mind. Thus, it has 
been proposed that, in addition to the cognitive account, there is a grammatical source for the 
acquisition of epistemic modal verbs (Heizmann 2006, Hacquard 2006, 2009, Cournane 2015). In 
contrast to adverbs/adjectives, in the case of modal verbs, children have to figure out that the same 
items can express both root and epistemic meanings, or that modal verbs followed by lexical verbs 
in the progressive/perfective aspect usually give rise to epistemic meanings (Kratzer 1981, 
Papafragou 1998, 2000, Avram 1999). The class of epistemic adverbs is not without its problems. 
Interestingly, there seems to be a much higher number of epistemic possibility adverbs in 
comparison to epistemic necessity adverbs. This cannot be captured by Theory of Mind alone, but 
rather by frequency in the input (Dieuleveut et al. 2019), or additional considerations, such as the 
necessity to resort to uncertainty markers in order to express uncertainty, but the absence of the 
necessity to resort to certainty markers in order to express certainty, as one can simply assert it. 
Acquisition studies on epistemic modality have almost exclusively looked at epistemic verbs 
rather than adverbs (Hirst & Weil 1982, Noveck, Ho & Sera 1996, Noveck 2001, Heizmann 2006, 
Ozturk & Papafragou 2015, Moscati, Zhan & Zhou 2017, a.o.), but their methodology is essential 
for our purposes. All the experiments rely on some version of the Hidden Object Paradigm, where 
participants have to infer the presence of a certain object/animal based on certain statements. 
However, there is variation in the conclusions about whether children behave adult-like or not.  
The first linguists to use this paradigm to investigate the semantics of epistemic modals were 
Hirst & Weil (1982), who implemented a Look for the Peanut Task, where 3-to-6-year-olds 
children heard statements (with epistemic modals) about a peanut, and they had to find it. Their 
results show sensitivity to modal strength: Children looked more for the peanut in a certain location 
when the sentence they heard contained a strong (certainty) modal than when it contained a weak 
(uncertainty) modal. This shows children as young as 3 have a grasp of the modal scale.  
Noveck, Ho & Sera (1996) and Noveck (2001) further investigated the semantics and 
pragmatics of epistemic modal verbs through the Box Paradigm, a variant of the Hidden Object 
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Paradigm making use of boxes. For instance, participants were told that a covered box, Box C has 
either the content of an open Parrot + Bear Box (containing a Parrot and a Bear) or the content of 
an open Parrot-only Box (containing only a Parrot). They were then asked to evaluate certain 
sentences describing the location of animals in Box C. With respect to the semantics of epistemic 
modal verbs, Noveck, Ho & Sera (1996) showed through a Forced Choice Task that, unlike 5-
year-olds, 7-year-olds prefer weaker true statements over stronger false (overly strong) statements 
at an adult-like rate. In addition, Noveck (2001) showed through a Truth Value Judgment Task 
that children derive implicatures with epistemic modals at a significantly lower rate than adults. 
However, these results may be considered slightly problematic given the complex nature of the 
task (the memory load, challenging instructions containing disjunctive statements, a.o.).  
Ozturk & Papafragou (2015) then investigated epistemic modals through a simplified version 
of the Box Paradigm, one where there were two boxes instead of three, and the instructions no 
longer contained disjunction as in Noveck, Ho & Sera (1996) or Noveck (2001). Children as young 
as 4 were able to draw implicatures (though not at fully adult-like rates) in a Forced Choice Task. 
Moreover, children were also able to understand the meaning of epistemic modals in a variety of 
situations. However, they often had problems when faced with a situation open to multiple 
possibilities, and they had to evaluate an overly strong statement which referred to only one of 
these. Similar conclusions have been reached by Moscati, Zhan & Zhou (2017) on the basis of an 
eye-tracking experiment in the visual paradigm. Children showed different fixation patterns than 
adults at the end of sentences containing the strong epistemic modal must in undetermined 
scenarios, which can be explained by their reducing multiple alternatives to a single one.  
While the results about how 5-year-olds treat overly strong epistemic statements seem to 
converge across experiments, the results about whether they derive scalar implicatures with 
epistemic modals do not. This could be an effect of the different tasks used, as children are known 
to perform more adult-like with Felicity Judgment/Forced Choice Tasks than with Truth Value 
Judgment Tasks, but it could also be related to the fact that the Hidden Object Paradigm may 
encourage participants to consider statements with weak epistemic modals optimal, given the fact 
that there is no direct access to the animal(s) hidden in the box, and children might be tempted to 
perceive the presence of an animal in the box as a possibility rather than a certainty. If this is so, 
however, it becomes unclear why children seem to accept overly strong statements: possible 
explanations involve cognitive considerations related to the reduction of uncertainty to certainty. 
 In order to probe into this matter further, Bleotu (2019) conducted an experimental study, 
investigating the semantic and pragmatic understanding of epistemic modals by Romanian 5-year-
olds, focusing on the more frequent adverbs sigur ‘certainly’ and poate ‘maybe’. The first 
experiment employed a Coloring Task where participants were asked to color certain drawings 
based on various statements containing (certainty/uncertainty) epistemic adverbs. In this 
experiment, children were sensitive to modal strength, always coloring the object in the color 
mentioned in the statement containing the certainty adverb, but only half of the time in the color 
mentioned in the statement containing the uncertainty adverb. The second experiment was a 
coloring version of the Truth Value Judgment Task in Noveck (2001), aiming to see if children 
derive implicatures with epistemic adverbs. The results did not provide evidence that 5-year-olds 
derived implicatures, in fact, children derived no implicatures at all. Interestingly, adults also 
showed rather low implicature rates (around 40%). Overall, adults tended to give cautious answers, 
often rejecting pragmatically adequate sentences with sigur ‘certainly’, arguing that they could not 
be certain about the situation because they could not see what was going on with their own eyes. 
Lack of direct access thus made adults hold back from asserting certainty. While Noveck (2001), 
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Ozturk & Papafragou (2015) and Moscati, Zhan & Zhou (2017) report no such problems with 
adults, the problem noticed in Bleotu (2019) calls for an improvement of the Hidden Object 
Paradigm in such a way as to make sure that participants (adults and children) can embrace 
epistemic certainty even when they cannot access the hidden object. Moreover, since both Noveck 
(2001) and Bleotu (2019) obtained low implicature rates with children with a Truth Value 
Judgment Task, a different task (e.g., a Reward Task) might produce more adult-like results. 
 
3. The Shadow Play experiment. Considering the indirect access challenge posed by the Hidden 
Object Paradigm, we decided to modify the paradigm so as to make it easier for children (and 
adults) to reason about a hidden entity. In our paradigm, participants are supported in their 
inferences by extra cues such as the animals’ silhouettes and specific sounds.  
 
 RATIONALE AND GOAL. The experiment we designed aims to investigate the mastery of the 
semantics and pragmatics of the epistemic modal adverbs sigur ‘certainly’ and poate ‘maybe’ by 
5-year-olds.  We decided to focus on epistemic adverbs rather than epistemic verbs, given the fact 
that trebuie ‘must’ with an epistemic meaning is very rare in adult Romanian. 
Using PennController (Zehr & Schwarz 2018), we implemented a novel Shadow Play 
Paradigm, where participants can see the animals’ silhouettes and hear their specific sounds. We 
took inspiration from shadow play theatre, an ancient form of story-telling making use of shadows, 
as well as from by Heizmann (2006), who used silhouettes behind a milky window to test whether 
German and English 3-year-olds are able to infer from a question such as Who must be eating the 
banana? that the banana-eater is hidden from sight and cannot be right before their eyes. Heizmann 
(2006) showed that, while the Theory of Mind definitely plays a part in the acquisition of modality, 
it seems that syntactic ambiguity or the lack thereof does too. While in contexts that are ambiguous 
between deontic and epistemic readings, children seem to prefer deontic readings over epistemic 
ones, children as young as 3 are able to understand epistemic verbs in a non-ambiguously epistemic 
context. The Shadow Play Paradigm takes the idea of employing silhouettes as a starting point for 
testing the semantic and pragmatic understanding of epistemic adverbs. Instead of focusing on 
indirect inferences (i.e., inferences about the lack of direct access to a certain entity), as in 
Heizmann (2006), we focused on epistemic modal strength and scalar implicatures with epistemic 
adverbs. Representing entities as silhouettes justifies the use of epistemic adverbs (given the lack 
of direct access to the animals). Moreover, it makes the indirect evidence more ‘direct’, as 
participants are no longer in doubt about the animal’s location, but, instead, they can rely on 
evidence (the animal’s silhouette and specific sounds). 
In terms of task type, the paradigm asks participants to reward baby dragons with big or small 
apples depending on whether what they say is the best description of the situation or not. The Best 
Description Task we used is a binary version of the ternary Reward Task from Katsos & Bishop 
(2011), where children reward statements with huge/big/small strawberries. We decided to make 
optimality rather than truth value (right/wrong) a reward criterion due to the higher number of 
scalar implicatures obtained previously with the Best Description Task (Bleotu, Benz & Gotzner 
2020), as well as with the similar Best Response Paradigm (Gotzner & Benz 2018). Thus, given 
the use of the Shadow Play Paradigm and of the Best Description Task, we expect Romanian          
5-year-olds to perform somewhat better on the semantics and pragmatics of epistemic adverbs than 
in the previous tasks on modality (even if maybe not fully adult-like).  
 PARTICIPANTS. 35 5-year-olds (17 female and 18 male, Age range: 5-6;6, Mean age: 5;6) and 
a control group of 36 Romanian adults (undergraduates from the Faculty of Foreign Languages, at 
the University of Bucharest) took part in the experiment in exchange for course credit.  
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 PRETEST. Given the worry that children might not be able to understand the meaning of the 
best description in the instructions, we decided to run a superlative pretest before the experiment 
and filter out the children unable to handle superlatives. The pretest aimed to see how children 
understand superlatives both in deictic contexts, i.e., contexts where they could point to a certain 
object/animal, as well as in pragmatic contexts, i.e., contexts where children decided which 
statement best described a picture (see (1) and Figure 1). 
 
(1) a.  Show me the tallest giraffe/a peach which is big, but not the biggest. 





Figure 1: Example pictures for the superlative pretest 
 
 MAIN EXPERIMENT: METHODOLOGY. In the main part of the experiment, participants are told 
there is a wizard who plays a shadow game with two baby dragons Flurry and Bindy. In the game, 
there are various animals who go and hide behind the curtain, but they come in front of the curtain 
one by one later on, at different stages. The baby dragons take turns to say who they believe the 
shadow belongs to, based on the evidence they have. Participants have to reward them with a big 
apple if what they say is the best description of the situation and with a small apple otherwise.  
 
       
 
Figure 2: The wizard and the baby dragons            Figure 3: The rewards: a big or a small apple 
 
The experimental materials involve several associated pictures and sentences referring to various 
groups of animals: A control/training group of two bunnies (orange and pink), and 4 testing groups 
of three animals of the same category (of different colors) each: dogs, frogs, cats, cows. The design 
of the pictures (see Figures 4, 5, 6) tries to make it easy for participants to figure out the reference 
of the shadow (the main silhouette center-stage) and prevent processing difficulties (Crain & 
Thornton 1998), by presenting participants not only with information about the animals that are in 
front of the curtain (through a small image in the bottom part of the picture), but also with 
information about all the animals in the game (through a small image on the left).  
 In total, participants saw 31 sentences (3 training sentences, 1x4=4 test sentences, 4x7= 
control sentences) containing poate ‘maybe’ or sigur ‘certainly’, presented in a randomized 
manner (see Table 1). All the sentences (except for the practice ones) have the same structure: the 
epistemic adverb poate ‘maybe’ and sigur ‘certainly’ followed by the complementizer cǎ ‘that’ 
and an embedded sentence referring to the identity of the silhouette. Importantly, optimal sentences 
with sigur ‘certainly’ (uttered by one dragon) are always followed by the corresponding 
Proceedings of ELM 1: 059-070, 2021
Adina Camelia Bleotu, Anton Benz and Nicole Gotzner:
Shadow playing with Romanian 5-year-olds. Epistemic adverbs are a kind of magic!. 63
 
underinformative sentences with poate ‘maybe’ (uttered by the other dragon). This contrast is 
maintained throughout to activate the modal scale and lead to implicature-generation.  
 

















Table 1: Types of sentences tested per scenario 
 
The experiment comprises a training session and a testing session. In the training session, 
participants practice the reward task on a bunny shadow picture (see Figure 4). Subjects were 
presented with the sentences in (2): they were told which reward to choose (the small apple) in the 
first sentence, while, in the other sentences, they had to choose the reward themselves. 
 
 
      
Figure 4: Item for the training session 
 
(2) a.  Este un şoarece/o vacǎ. (FALSE) 
                ‘It is a mouse/a cow.’ 
 b.   Este un iepuraş. (TRUE/OPTIMAL) 
          ‘It is a bunny.’ 
 
In Scenario 1, the One in front Scenario, one animal comes back in front of the curtain, in 
this case, the yellow dog (see Figure 5). This allows us to test participants’ understanding that the 
situation has two possible outcomes: the silhouette belongs either to the red dog or the blue dog. 
Subjects were presented with sentences such as those in (3): they had to choose a big apple for the 
optimal control statements in (3a) and a small apple for the overly strong statement in (3b).  
 
                
 
Figure 5: One in front Scenario          Figure 6:  Two in front Scenario   Figure 7. Disclosure 
   
(3) a.  Poate cǎ este cȃinele roşu/albastru. (OPTIMAL) 
     ‘It is possible that it is the red/blue dog.’ 
 b.   Sigur cǎ este cȃinele roşu. (OVERLY STRONG) 
   ‘It is certain that it is the red/blue dog.’  
 
In Scenario 2, the Two in front Scenario, two animals come back in front of the curtain 
(see Figure 6). Given such evidence, participants are supposed to reason that the silhouette can 
only belong to the blue dog. Subjects were presented with the critical sentences (4a, b) and the 
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control sentences (4c, d). Subjects who only consider semantic meaning are expected to reward 
the baby dragon with a big apple in conditions (4a) and (4b), while subjects who strengthen the 
weak epistemic to ‘not certain’ are expected to give a small apple reward for (4a) but not for (4b). 
The scenario is thus critical for establishing whether subjects derive implicatures.  
 
(4) a.  Poate cǎ este cȃinele albastru. (UNDERINFO) 
                 ‘It is possible that it is the blue dog.’ 
 b.   Sigur cǎ este cȃinele albastru. (OPTIMAL) 
                  ‘It is certain that it is the blue dog.’ 
 c.   Poate cǎ este cȃinele roşu. (FALSE) 
      ‘It is possible that it is the red dog.’ 
 d.   Sigur cǎ este cȃinele galben. (FALSE) 
      ‘It is certain that it is the yellow dog.’ 
 
In the end, the identity of the animal is disclosed. While Hirst & Weil (1982) showed that 
disclosure does not affect experimental results, we decided to opt for disclosure regardless, as we 
felt it would keep subjects more engaged and quench their curiosity. 
 RESULTS. We analyzed the accuracy of the answers in control statements, depending upon 
whether more than half of the answers were correct, and we excluded two adults from further 
analyses. In the case of children, we looked at the accuracy of the answers in the pretest and 
removed no participants, since all children gave more than 3 correct answers out of 6. Moreover, 
since all children were more than half of the time accurate in the control sentences, they were all 
included in the analysis. The results were analyzed with logit mixed-effects models in R (2018).  
3.5.1 WHOLE DATA ANALYSIS. We computed a logit mixed-effects model with the factors Group 
(Adults, Children), Sentence type (Underinformative, Overly Strong, Control), as well as their 
interaction as fixed effects, and random by-item and by-participant slopes. The Control Statements 
of the Adult Group were chosen as the reference level. The results do not show significance for 
Group, but there was a significant effect for Sentence type (both for Underinformative and Overly 
Strong statements), an interaction between Group and Underinformative Sentences, as well as an 
interaction between Group and Overly Strong Sentences (see Table 2). 
 
 
Table 2: Results of a glmer performed on the whole data 
 
3.5.2 SUBSET ANALYSIS. We divide the subset analysis into three parts: scalar implicatures, control 
statements, and overly strong statements.  
For scalar implicatures, the whole data analysis does not reveal precise information about 
implicature derivation since a participant’s choice of a small apple for underinformative sentences 
like (4a) simply indicates the degree to which participants rejected underinformative statements as 
not the best description of a situation. However, such rejection can happen for two reasons: (i) 
Parameter Estimate Std. error z p 
Intercept -0.036 0.098 -0.369 0.712 
Group (children)    0.174 0.142 1.217 0.224 
Sentence type Overly Strong 1.375 0.226 6.088 1.14e-09 *** 
Sentence type Underinformative 0.829 0.203       4.093 4.25e-05*** 
Group (children): Sentence type Overly Strong -1.904 0.296 -6.423 1.33e-10*** 
Group (children): Sentence type Underinformative -0.996          0.277 -3.596 0.000323*** 
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either because participants believe the stronger alternative is the best description, (ii) or because 
they believe the stronger alternative is false, hence, also not the best description. Since we did not 
ask subjects to motivate their answers, the only way to determine their pattern of thinking is by 
looking at the corresponding stronger alternatives. On this basis, we can distinguish between 




Table 3: Subjects’ patterns of responses in underinformative and optimal true sentences 
 
 
66.18% of the answers produced by adults were scalar implicatures with epistemic adverbs: 
22 adults consistently rejected underinformative statements (3 or 4 answers out of 4). 49.28% of 
children’s answers were scalar implicatures with epistemic adverbs: 15 children consistently 
produced implicatures (see Figure 8). 49.28% of children’s answers were ‘overgenerous’ (logical): 
14 were consistent in their answers.  Importantly, there were few erroneous or cautious answers, 
thus showing that the Shadow Play Paradigm encourages logical reasoning. In the Hidden Object 
Paradigm, subjects had to rely exclusively on logical reasoning to infer that sentences with certain 
are correct, and experimental results show that purely logical inference is too weak a basis for 
inferring certainty (Bleotu 2019). The Shadow Play Paradigm remedies such worries by providing 




Figure 8: Scalar implicatures per group 
 
In addition, we computed a logit mixed-effects model on a subset of the data, with the rate of scalar 
implicatures as the dependent variable, Group as a fixed effect, and random by-item and by-
participant slopes. This model revealed no significant difference between the groups (β =  
−1.816, SE = 1.0163, Z = −1.787, p = 0.0739).  
As presented in Table 4, children behaved adult-like with respect to the control sentences, as 
also revealed by running a logit mixed-effects model on the control data subset with Group, Truth 
and their interaction as factors, and Item and Participant as random effects. The results show non-
significance for Group (β = −0.578, SE = 0.625, Z = −0.925, p = 0.355) and the interaction between 
Group and Truth (β = −0.207, SE = 0.519, Z = −0.398, p = 0.691), but a significant Truth effect (β 
= −2.1607, SE = 0.391, Z = −5.529, p < 0.001). Most errors (93.91% errors for children, 87.5% 
errors for adults) were made in evaluating true sentences containing a possibility adverb, especially 
 
Patterns of  
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Table 4: Accuracy per group in control sentence 
 
As shown in Figure 9, children tend to reward overly strong statements (using ‘certainly’ 
instead of ‘maybe’) with big apples to a much higher degree than adults (59.29% > 21.33%). The 
difference between groups is significant, as shown by a logit mixed-effects model on the overly 
strong data with Group as a factor and random by-item and by-participant slopes (β = −4.158, SE 
= 1.904, Z = −2.184, p = 0.029). 
 
 
Figure 9: Yes to overly strong statements per Group (with SE) 
 
4. Discussion. Our results show that Romanian 5-year-olds are able to derive implicatures with 
epistemic adverbs in underinformative contexts. While a whole data analysis reveals a significant 
difference between children and adults, as in Noveck (2001) or Ozturk & Papafragou (2015), the 
rejection of underinformative sentences does not equate with implicature-derivation. For this 
reason, we also performed several subset analyses taking into account adults’ answers to the strong 
alternatives of underinformative sentences. The subset analysis investigating implicature-
generation showed children to be quite adult-like. This shows that children do not lack the capacity 
to derive implicatures, but, rather, they show sensitivity to the paradigm and task used. On the one 
hand, the current experiment makes use of an improved version of the Hidden Object Paradigm 
used in previous experiments on epistemic modal items, namely, the Shadow Play Paradigm, 
where children’s logical reasoning is supported by additional visual and acoustic cues. Unlike in 
Noveck (2001) or Ozturk & Papafragou (2015), children do not have to rely exclusively on logical 
reasoning in making inferences about a completely hidden animal, but they can, in addition, use 
silhouettes and sounds as further support. On the other hand, the current experiment also uses a 
different kind of task than the previous experiments on epistemic modals, namely, a binary Reward 
Task with optimality as a criterion. Noveck (2001) employs a Truth Value Judgment Task on 
which 5-year-olds perform significantly different from adults. Ozturk & Papafragou (2015) 
employ a Felicity Judgment Task on which children perform better than in Noveck (2001), but still 
not adult-like. In contrast, in our experiment, children perform adult-like. Since reward tasks are 
known to lead to more implicatures with quantifiers than other kinds of tasks (Katsos & Bishop 
2011), it is not surprising that the same effect can be seen with epistemic adverbs. It is also 
Accuracy per group in control sentences Children Adults 
Optimal true control sentences 
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important that we were able to extend this result to Romanian. Improving the paradigm and 
changing the task reveal that Romanian children as young as 5 have pragmatic abilities. 
In addition, we found that children also handle optimal true and false control statements with 
epistemic adverbs in an adult-like manner. Thus, when children’s pragmatics is adult-like, the 
semantics seems to be in place also, an important result which is in line with the idea that semantic 
knowledge precedes pragmatic knowledge (Noveck 2001).  
While adult-like in their derivation of scalar implicatures and their understanding of control 
statements, children are not adult-like in their treatment of overly strong statements, rewarding 
such statements with big apples to a higher degree than adults. The tendency to consider overly 
strong statements as adequate descriptions has previously been noticed in the studies by Noveck, 
Ho, Sera (1996), Ozturk & Papafragou (2015), and Moscati, Zhan & Zhou (2017). When faced 
with several possibilities, children tend to pick one possibility only. For example, in a situation 
where the silhouette could belong either to the blue dog or the red dog, there are children who give 
big apple rewards for statements which express certainty about the silhouette belonging to one of 
the dogs. There are several possible explanations for this. One possible explanation could be that 
children have a different semantics for the strong epistemic adverb sigur ‘certainly’: children could 
understand it as meaning ‘maybe’. Nevertheless, this explanation is undermined by children’s 
correct assessment of control statements with sigur ‘certainly’, as well as by children’s sensitivity 
to epistemic adverb strength (see Bleotu 2019). Another possible explanation could be that 
children use a cognitive strategy to reduce uncertainty to certainty. Such a hypothesis, also known 
as the premature closure hypothesis (Acredolo & Horobin 1987), argues that children’s answers 
reflect their cognitive intolerance of situations that allow multiple outcomes and their overarching 
preference for a single solution. Another explanation could be that children’s answers reflect 
neither a faulty semantics for the strong epistemic adverb, nor a cognitive strategy to eliminate 
uncertainty, but rather a guessing communicative strategy, leading children to place a bet on one 
of the possibilities when the evidence is not conclusive. Teasing apart the cognitive and the 
communicative account is difficult, especially if we embrace the view that communication mirrors 
cognition. Children’s ‘guesses’ could be a reflex of a cognitive tendency to make certainty 
subjective. For instance, when evaluating the statement It is certain that it (the silhouette) is the 
red dog in a context where it is only possible that the silhouette is the red dog, one child explicitly 
motivated his big apple answer by saying that he likes red a lot. This suggests that ‘guesses’ might 
not be random, and, instead, cognitive/communicative reductions of uncertainty to certainty may 
be modulated by personal likes/dislikes. However, subjective reasons do not fully explain the 
results since children only ‘randomly’ choose after having already restricted the set of possible 
outcomes through an inference. Importantly, when the silhouette can be the red or blue dog, 
children exclude the impossible outcome (giving small apples for false statements like It is certain 
that it is the yellow dog), and they infer the two possible alternatives (giving big apples for both 
optimal statements with possible). Reducing uncertainty to certainty thus involves a logical step, 
where children infer the two possible outcomes, followed by a subjective step, where children 
make a choice between them, depending upon their own preferences and inclinations.  
5. Conclusion. The current experiment employed a novel Shadow Play Paradigm in order to test 
Romanian 5-year-olds’ semantic and pragmatic knowledge of epistemic adverbs. Unlike more 
traditional versions of the Hidden Object Paradigm, the Shadow Play Paradigm gives participants 
additional evidence in order to help them perform in a more adult-like fashion. The results revealed 
children’s near adult-like ability to draw implicatures with epistemic adverbs. However, children 
seemed to accept overly strong sentences to a much higher degree than adults. This can be 
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accounted for if one assumes a stage in language acquisition where, although children are able to 
infer that a situation has two outcomes, they make a subjective choice for one single outcome. 
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